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ABSTRACT 
 This paper examines the effect of recent regulations on executive incentive 
compensation contracting among US banks.  Following regulations (the Guidance on 
Sound Incentive Compensation Policies and the Dodd-Frank Act Section 956) intended 
to prevent incentive compensation arrangements that encourage imprudent risk-taking, I 
test whether pay-for-performance is weaker and the penalty for downside tail risk is 
stronger in the post-crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis period.  Specifically, I 
compare the impact of the regulations on large banks versus small banks, using the latter 
to control for concurrent events.  Consistent with regulatory intent, I find evidence of 
weaker pay-for-performance and larger penalties for downside tail risk for CEOs of large 
banks in the post-crisis years, as compared to small banks.  Together, the results provide 
evidence on the effectiveness of new regulations in curbing bank CEOs’ incentives, as 
well as introduce downside tail risk as a determinant of compensation in the banking 
industry. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, an ongoing debate surrounds whether 
compensation incentives caused banking executives to take on excessive risk, which 
further contributed to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  Due to the severe negative 
externalities associated with the potential failure of large banks, the US government 
introduced regulations aimed at improving bank incentive compensation arrangements to 
maintain their safety and soundness.1  The common theme of these regulatory 
interventions is to prohibit incentive compensation arrangements that encourage 
imprudent risk-taking.  Although partially in the proposed rule stage, some of the 
regulations’ changes have already occurred in the banking sector.2  However, many 
criticize the proposed rules, indicating concerns that the regulations would harm the 
efficiency of the executive labor market, and make it difficult for the affected financial 
institutions to attract and retain top talent.3  This has led to calls to repeal these 
regulations.  Since 2017, the proposed rules have been deferred on regulators’ rule-
making agenda.  
This paper investigates the effect of two key regulatory changes on executive 
                                                 
1  In particular, I analyze two new regulations that target banks only: the Guidance on Sound 
Incentive Compensation Policies and the Dodd-Frank Section 956.  The former covers 
commercial banks; and the latter covers not only commercial banks but also investment banks, 
brokers and dealers.  Throughout this study, I will loosely refer to the covered financial 
institutions as “banks”.  Other post-crisis regulations on compensation apply to all public 
firms, such as “say-on-pay”.  My use of the term “regulations” in this study specifically 
excludes “say-on-pay” and related initiatives. 
2   The Federal Reserve noted changes in a review of 25 large banks from 2009 to 2011.  The 
review report can be found here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-
reports/files/incentive-compensation-practices-report-201110.pdf. 
3  See regulators’ discussion of comments that they receive for the Guidance: 
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/federal-register/75fr36395.pdf. 
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incentive compensation contracting at banks: the Guidance on Sound Incentive Policies, 
and Section 956 of Dodd-Frank.  Specifically, it focuses on changes in two characteristics 
of incentive design: the strength of pay-for-performance (or pay-performance sensitivity, 
abbreviated “PPS”), and the strength of penalty for downside tail risk.  To avoid 
“excessive” incentive compensation, banks may grant lower levels of incentive pay for 
the same level of performance: i.e., decrease PPS in the post-crisis period.  To discourage 
managerial activities that can lead to material financial losses, banks can make greater 
downward adjustments to compensation for certain risk metrics: i.e. imposing a greater 
penalty to executives for extremely bad risk outcomes, in the post-crisis period than in 
the pre-crisis period.4 
However, it is unclear if these expected changes will occur.  From the regulators’ 
perspective, there is uncertainty on the effective enforcement of the new regulations.  
First, the provisions under Dodd-Frank Act Section 956 remain in proposed rule stage; 
thus, it is unclear how regulators would enforce them.  Secondly, frictions such as 
information asymmetry (e.g., due to the complexity of executive compensation contracts) 
and limited resources (due to the number of firms under their jurisdiction) suggest that 
regulators may be unable to fully assess whether incentives from compensation actually 
violate the imposed regulations.  Finally, regulators may be captured due to the 
“revolving door” between public-sector regulators and private-sector executives, 
                                                 
4  The penalty for downside tail risk in this paper refers to a downward adjustment of 
compensation in correspondence to downside tail risk measures.  It takes the implicit form of 
reduced compensation, and does not mean that CEOs need to pay explicit fines to their 
employer for downside tail risk. 
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compromising their ability to conduct effective supervision.  From the banks’ 
perspective, boards still retain significant discretion in designing compensation contracts, 
since the regulations are principle-based rather than rule-based.  This suggests that banks 
can use indirect tools to change their incentive compensation contracting (such as longer 
vesting periods, more deferred compensation, or stricter clawback provisions), instead of 
explicitly decreasing PPS and increasing the penalty for downside tail risk.  Because 
regulators have lower risk tolerance than shareholders, the changes desired by regulators 
can conflict with maximization of shareholder wealth.  The regulations also force bank 
managers to have more “skin in the game.”  As a result, the resistance from shareholders 
and managers may prevent any meaningful changes from occurring. 
One challenge to assess the effects of regulation on compensation is establishing 
causality between the new regulations and the observed changes due to other concurrent 
compensation regulation changes, such as “say-on-pay.”  Accordingly, I exploit a 
difference-in-differences design to disentangle the impact of the specific regulation 
targeting incentive compensation contracting in the financial sector relative to other 
potentially correlated contemporaneous regulatory and non-regulatory effects.  Because 
the regulations explicitly place more stringent requirements on larger banks, I partition 
the sample into a treatment group (large banks) and a control group (small banks).  In 
particular, I expect the regulatory changes to impact large banks more significantly than 
small banks.   
In support of my expectations, I find strong evidence that PPS is weaker, and that 
the penalty for downside tail risk is stronger, in the post-crisis period among large banks 
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as compared to small banks.  Further, falsification tests support a causal relation between 
the regulations and the observed changes by showing that: (1) the observed changes are 
unlikely driven by other factors, such as TARP constraints or the self-correction of large 
banks; and (2) the increased penalty occurs only to downside tail risk but not to other risk 
measures, such as total or systemic risk.  As the regulations cover not only CEOs but also 
other employees who can expose their organization to significant risk, I also look at CFO 
compensation contracts.5  The empirical results provide similar evidence of increased 
penalty for downside tail risk, and much weaker evidence of decreased PPS among bank 
CFOs; this can reflect that non-CEO executives typically receive a lower proportion of 
total pay in the form of incentive pay.  Together, the empirical results suggest that recent 
regulations are effective in preventing compensation incentives that may lead managers 
to adopt imprudent risk-taking behavior. 
The empirical analyses provide two additional observations.  First, I find that 
downside tail risk is actually rewarded among large banks in the pre-crisis period, rather 
than penalized.  This is consistent with the regulators’ belief that incentive compensation 
contracting prior to the new regulation was not compatible with effective risk control.  
Second, I find no significant pay-for-performance among large banks in the post-crisis 
period.  However, one should interpret this result with caution when drawing inferences 
on the overall level of CEO incentive because this study focuses on the design of flow 
compensation contracts.  The literature has shown that a major portion of CEO’s 
                                                 
5  For example, the Guidance applies to senior officers, including “named officers” for publicly 
traded companies.  See Footnote 10 of the Guidance for details. 
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incentives derives from the holdings of stock and options previously granted.  This 
portfolio of stock and options may mitigate the problem of misaligned interests between 
bank shareholders and managers, but it does not resolve the conflicting interests between 
bank shareholders and regulators.   
The findings in the paper provide important policy implications.  In particular, 
they provide direct evidence for the effects of new regulations.  The relation between 
compensation and downside tail risk also sheds light on the compatibility between 
incentive compensation contracts and the safety and soundness of banks in both the pre- 
and post-crisis period.  Finally, the results are relevant to the debate around the more 
restrictive rules of Dodd-Frank Section 956 that were proposed in 2016. 
Besides policy implications, this study contributes to the compensation 
contracting literature by considering the unique institutional setting of banks, as opposed 
to non-financial firms.  Specifically, I examine how downside tail risk impacts 
compensation contracts, which has not been formally considered in prior research.  In a 
classical principal-agent model, agents (managers) are assumed to be more risk-averse 
than principals (shareholders).  Thus, the primary goal of incentive compensation is to 
motivate managers to take more risks.  This association gets more complicated when 
considering the effects of debt: Jensen and Meckling (1976) argues that shareholders of 
levered firms may prefer firms to invest in risky projects to transfer wealth from 
debtholders to shareholders (i.e., engage in “risk-shifting”).  These effects are 
exacerbated in the financial sector due to relatively high leverage ratios, and the potential 
for regulators to largely absorb the downside tail risk.  Therefore, risk-taking by bank 
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managers when maximizing shareholder wealth can be seen as excessive from regulator’s 
point of view.  This suggests regulators may want boards to add some disincentives to 
bank managers to mitigate excessive risk-taking.  In particular, regulators can prod 
boards to introduce penalties for downside tail risk, as a proxy for excessive risk-taking, 
into CEO compensation contracts for banks.  Thus, this paper provides the first piece of 
evidence on the contracting role of downside tail risk, and builds upon prior research 
examining compensation contracts (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Jin, 2002; Cheng, 
Hong, and Scheinkman, 2015). 
Section 2 summarizes prior research.  Section 3 introduces the regulations, and 
develops the hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the empirical models.  Section 5 presents 
the empirical analysis.  Section 6 summarizes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
2.1 Pay, Performance and Risk 
This paper relates to the broad area of literature on compensation contracting.  
Specifically, it relates to the literature on how the level of compensation adjusts based on 
various observable factors.  Performance and risk as two main outcomes of managerial 
actions are discussed here.  Given the intense regulatory oversight of the financial sector, 
there can be fundamental differences in compensation contracting between financial 
firms and non-financial firms, so a large body of compensation literature excludes 
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financial sector.  In this paper, I only discuss the literature that applies to financial firms.6  
Pay-for-performance has been extensively studied, where performance is usually 
measured by stock returns or (the change in) return on assets.  John and John (1993) 
models the optimal compensation contract in the presence of debt and predicts that PPS 
should decrease with leverage when considering the agency cost of debt.  John and Qian 
(2003) confirms this prediction by showing that PPS in banks is lower than that in 
manufacturing firms.  Bennett, Gopalan, and Thakor (2016) finds that, compared to non-
financial firms, financial firms (including banks and insurance firms) link a higher 
proportion of executive compensation to accounting performance and a lower proportion 
to stock returns.  
How risk affects compensation contracting originates from the classical principal-
agency theory.  The theoretical and empirical results generally suggest that (exogenous) 
firm risk affects both the strength of incentive and the dollar value of compensation.  
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) proposes and finds that executive pay-for-performance 
sensitivity decreases with firm total risk; Jin (2002) further decomposes total risk into 
idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk, and shows that the level of CEO’s incentives 
(measured by the delta of her equity portfolio) decreases with firms’ idiosyncratic risk 
but is not affected by systematic risk.7  Cheng et al. (2015) argues that riskier firms need 
to provide higher levels of total compensation to attract risk-averse managers and finds 
                                                 
6  I focus on studies that either do not differentiate between financial firms from non-financial 
firms or that look exclusively within the financial sector.  I exclude from my discussion studies 
on non-financial firms for the sake of brevity and relevance. 
7  According to the sample description, these two papers, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Jin 
(2002), use data from ExecuComp for both financial firms and non-financial firms. 
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consistent results among US financial firms during 1992–2008.  Guo, Jalal, and Khaksari 
(2015) also documents a similar positive association between CEO compensation and 
total firm risk.  In contrast to these previous studies, Bennett et al. (2016) shows that bank 
managers’ performance targets are not adjusted for risk during the period 2006-2014.  
This study contributes to the prior literature by addressing two deficiencies in the 
literature on how risk affects compensation contracting.  First, when measuring risk, the 
above empirical studies do not distinguish between upside and downside risk.  The three 
mostly used measures of risk are total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk.  
Ignoring higher moments of the outcome distribution may be insufficient from the 
perspective of financial regulators, who clearly worry only about the downside risk, 
especially the downside tail risk.  On the other hand, bank executives benefit from gains 
in banks but are largely protected from losses.  They probably lack the incentive to put 
sufficient weight on downside risk when choosing risky projects, as argued by Bebchuk 
and Spamann (2010).  Therefore, downside tail risk may be an additional determinant of 
compensation contracts in banks.  A penalty for downside tail risk in compensation 
contract would force bank executives to internalize the negative externality from 
excessive risk-taking. The distinct incentives for downside tail risk cannot be determined 
using only traditional risk measures.  
Second, the prior literature tends to focus on the exogenous component of risk and 
to study its impact on compensation contracting from the perspective of the participation 
constraint.  This perspective ignores the fact that part of risk is also an outcome of 
managerial actions.  Thus, risk can affect compensation contracting through the incentive 
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compatibility constraint as well.  Though not the focus of this paper, a large stream of the 
literature focuses on how incentives affect risk.  The strength of incentives can be 
measured by the slope and convexity of equity compensation or firm-related wealth to 
firm performance as well as the percentage of incentive compensation.  These papers 
generally support the wealth transfer argument, that better alignment of interests between 
shareholders and managers induces managers to choose higher risk level to shift wealth 
from debtholders to shareholders (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990; Noe, Rebello, 
and Wall, 1996;  Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Kuang and Qin, 2013; Chen et al., 2006; 
Mehran and Rosenberg, 2007; DeYoung et al., 2013; Balachandran et al., 2010; Guo, 
Jalal, and Khaksari, 2015; Bennett et al., 2016).8  This study relies on the extension of the 
relationship between incentive and risk shown above.  That is, risk, just like performance, 
should be at least partially controllable by CEO.  If not, there is no need to design 
incentives for better risk outcomes. Therefore, this study assumes that a firm’s risk is also 
a result of CEO’s actions that should be contracted upon, just like performance.  
2.2 Regulation and Compensation Contracting 
This study is also closely related to a stream of literature examining how 
regulation affects compensation contracting.  In the past, the US banking industry 
experienced waves of deregulations.  Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995) and Hubbard 
                                                 
8  A similar positive association between convexity and (future) risk is documented in non-
financial firms (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006, among others).  Although 
Hayes et al. (2012) document that some part of convexity resulted from extracting the 
accounting benefits of option grants and does not seem to be associated with risk.  On the 
other hand, Koharki, Ringgenberg, and Watson (2018) argue that convexity can also benefit 
creditors by motivating managers to take more positive-NPV projects. 
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and Palia (1995) both document an increase in PPS after bank deregulation in the 1980s.  
The deregulations in these two studies are about releasing constraints on bank operations, 
not directly about management compensation.  Therefore, the authors interpret the 
change in PPS as a voluntary adjustment of compensation contracting to new investment 
opportunities.  This is different from the regulations studied in this paper, which directly 
address compensation.  
After the 2007–2008 crisis, many countries and other jurisdictions increased the 
regulation of compensation in banks, following the Guidelines on Sound Compensation 
proposed by the Financial Stability Board.  The detailed implementation varies across 
countries.  Two studies examine their effect on compensation contracting from different 
perspectives. Kleymenova and Tuna (2018) looks at the consequences of compensation 
regulations in the UK.  They find that the capital market views some regulation positively 
(i.e., the UK Remuneration Code) and other regulation (i.e., the EU bonus cap) 
negatively, consistent with the view that regulating bankers’ compensation is not always 
in the best interest of shareholders. The results also show that after the regulation on 
compensation, UK banks have more deferred bonuses, higher PPS and option use and 
that banks become less risky.  Finally, their paper documents higher CEO turnover and 
increased complexity in bank CEO compensation contracts.  Cerasi et al. (2017) 
examines banks from multiple jurisdictions, some that adopt the new regulations on 
compensation and others that do not.  Using a difference-in-differences design, the paper 
finds that CEO compensation at banks in treated jurisdictions is less positively associated 
with profits and more negatively associated with total risk, i.e. a decreased PPS and an 
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increased penalty for total risk.  
My study differs from these two papers in two substantive ways.  First, I examine 
banks in the US, where the rule-making process is still ongoing and thus its effect more 
uncertain.  This setting also addresses the power of regulators absent the effect of public 
comment, which could reinforce the captured nature of regulators.  Second, and more 
importantly, I look at the penalty for downside tail risk, a characteristic that is arguably 
more straightforward in capturing the intent of the regulations to curb excessive risk-
taking behavior. 
 
3. Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Regulations to Align Reward and Risk among Banks 
One crucial distinction between risk-taking by banks as opposed to non-financial 
firms is that the realizations of extreme negative outcomes for financial firms are 
protected by the federal safety net, such as deposit insurance from the FDIC, discount 
window lending from the FRS, and even government bailout during times of emergency.  
Therefore, one major goal of bank regulation is to maintain the safety and soundness of 
banks.  Bank regulators typically use the CAMELS rating system to evaluate banks.  It 
contains six aspects: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and 
sensitivity to market risk.  Earnings is one consideration because theoretically any firm 
who can't create return for capital will eventually go bankrupt.  Financial institutions are 
no exceptions.  But pursuing earnings can sometimes conflict with other aspects.  For 
example, some risky long-term loans may bring magnificent earnings for the short term, 
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while reducing capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity, as well as increasing banks’ 
sensitivity to market risk. In this sense, the goals of bank regulators and shareholders do 
not coincide with each other.  
In addition, the protection provided by bank regulators effectively provides bank 
shareholders with inappropriate risk-taking incentives.  The basic logic is as follows: if 
the risk outcome is positive, return primarily goes to shareholders; and if the risk 
outcome is extremely negative, the regulators may step in and absorbs the majority of the 
losses.  As a result, the risk level that shareholders of an individual bank are willing to 
bear may exceed the level that regulators wish to be exposed to considering the 
macroeconomy.  If bank managers’ interests are perfectly aligned with shareholders, they 
may choose a risk level that is too high from the regulators’ point of view.  To correct 
this problem, regulatory invention is needed to better align bank managers’ interests with 
those of regulators, even though this deviates from the optimum from the shareholders’ 
perspective. 
US regulators have started to oversee bank employee compensation since the 
early 1990s, as written in the Section 132 Standards for safety and soundness of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”).  Banks 
are prohibited from providing compensation that is excessive or that could lead to 
material financial losses.  According to the standards, employee compensation is 
considered “excessive” when the amounts paid are either “unreasonable or 
disproportionate to the services actually performed” by considering several factors: the 
total compensation, the compensation history of the employee and peers, the financial 
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condition of the bank, the compensation practices at peer banks, the projected total post-
employment benefits, whether the employee is involved in misconduct, and other factors 
that regulators consider to be relevant.  Four federal bank regulators examine banks to 
determine whether they are in compliance with the safety and soundness standards or 
not.9  However, there were no detailed standards guiding the compensation contracting 
practices as the regulators wanted to give banks flexibility and avoid micro-management. 
In the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, regulators believe that bankers’ 
incentive pay is one of the contributing factors to the crisis.  A series of government 
interventions have been launched, aiming to improve the “incentive” compensation 
practices within a broader range of banks to maintain the safety and soundness of the 
whole financial system.  In the middle of 2010, four U.S. regulatory agencies jointly 
issued the Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies (the “Guidance”) for 
banking organizations under their supervision.10  The Guidance explicitly requires all 
banks under the supervision of any of the four agencies to design and implement their 
incentive compensation contracts to “appropriately balance risk and reward”, to “be 
compatible with effective controls and risk management”, and to “be supported by strong 
corporate governance.”  They require banks to have incentive compensation 
arrangements that are “consistent with safety and soundness, even when these practices 
go beyond those needed to align shareholder and employee interests.”  An example of 
                                                 
9  See for example, the discussion in the Guidance: https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/federal-
register/75fr36395.pdf. 
10  The agencies are the Federal Reserve System (FRS), The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS). 
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poorly designed compensation contract, as pointed out by the Guidance, is one that links 
compensation to short-term profits without considering the associated risk.  
Later in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”) was signed into law, bringing profound changes to the financial 
industry, broadening the regulated institutions from depository institutions to investment 
banks and other financial institutions.  Building on the standards from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”) and the principles 
from the Guidance of 2010, Dodd-Frank Section 956 prescribed more details regulating 
incentive-based compensation among banks.  According to the 2011 proposed rules, 
financial institutions with at least $1 billion of consolidated total assets are subject to 
Dodd-Frank Section 956, with financial institutions defined as the following: (1) a 
depository institution; (2) a broker-dealer; (3) a credit union; (4) an investment advisor; 
(5) Fannie Mae; (6) Freddie Mac; (7) any other financial institution designated by 
regulators.  Although the 2011 rules under Dodd-Frank Section 956 were not effective 
immediately, many of the practices proposed were put in place by many large banks in 
2011, according to a review report by the Federal Reserve System.11  The report finds 
that banks use two major methods to prevent imprudent risk taking: risk adjustment of 
awards and deferral of payments.  
Both the Guidance and Dodd-Frank Section 956 treat banks differently, 
depending primarily on their size.  The Guidance requires larger banks to have 
                                                 
11  See https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/incentive-compensation-
practices-report-201110.pdf.  
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“systematic and formalized policies, procedures and processes” in place, while smaller 
banks can have “less extensive, formalized, and detailed” procedures in place.12  Dodd-
Frank Section 956 explicitly defines a covered bank as one with total assets larger than 
$1 billion.  It further uses total assets of $50 billion as the cutoff point to classify a 
“larger covered financial institution” within each type of covered financial institutions 
based on total assets.13  Under both regulations, larger banks must comply with more 
stringent rules.  
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
As a result of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, financial regulators issued rules to 
prohibit incentive compensation from being excessive or encouraging imprudent risk-
taking.  While the regulation does not provide explicit guidance on what “excessive” 
incentive compensation entails, one manifestation is to prevent abnormally high pay for 
performance.  Moreover, prior literature has shown that stronger incentive is positively 
associated with bank risk-taking.  For example, Noe et al. (1996) proposes a theoretical 
model in which linking bonus to performance may induce risk-seeking behaviors among 
bank managers.  Saunders et al. (1990) documents that large commercial banks with 
higher managerial ownership exhibit higher capital market risk during the deregulation 
period of 1978-1985.  Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)  shows that bank CEOs’ equity 
portfolio delta (the change in the value of equity portfolio to a 1% change in stock price) 
                                                 
12  The “large banking organizations” (or LBOs) under the Guidance refer to a set of large and 
complex banks that are identified by the federal regulators for supervision purposes. 
13  The larger covered banks under Dodd-Frank Act generally refer to those with total assets 
larger than 50 billion dollars. 
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in 2006 is negatively associated with banks’ performance during the crisis.  
Compensation incentives can interact with institutional factors in the financial sector to 
magnify firm risk.14  Noe et al. (1996) demonstrates that shareholder-designed 
compensation contracts may further exacerbate the risk-taking incentives of managers of 
troubled banks.  Therefore, weakening incentive compensation is a natural way to 
weaken excessive risk-taking.  Weakening incentive can be achieved through various 
ways. Reducing the strength of incentive can be one. For example, less compensation can 
be granted for the same level of performance. Making performance targets more difficult 
to achieve is another way.  On the other hand, it was noted by the Federal Reserve that 
some large banks defer more compensation to the future and use longer performance 
period after the crisis. Both practices can weaken the association between performance 
and compensation in the short term. Therefore,  I expect to find a decrease in PPS under 
the new regulations, compared to the years before the regulations.  
The regulations explicitly differentiate between large and small banks.  According 
to the Guidance and Dodd-Frank Section 956, more stringent regulations apply to large 
banks for two reasons.  First, large banks use incentive compensation more intensively 
than small ones; second, failure of large banks is more detrimental to the economy.  
Therefore, the expected changes are more likely to occur within large banks than small 
ones.  This leads to my first hypothesis as follows: 
                                                 
14  Some analytical studies have shown that deposit insurance alone can encourage risk-taking 
among banks (Kareken  and Wallace, 1978; Merton, 1978; Sharpe, 1978, among others). 
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H1: PPS decreases more from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period among 
large banks than small banks. 
The new regulations also aim to prevent incentives that can induce imprudent 
risk-taking, which is not equivalent to promote less risk-taking.  While less risk-taking 
reduces imprudent negative outcomes, it may also excessively stifle regulators’ 
attainment of its goal that financial institutions loan money to (risky) firms to expand the 
economy.  As discussed in Section 2, commonly used risk measures, such as total risk 
and idiosyncratic risk, group volatility from the upside and downside together.  
Therefore, decreased total risk or idiosyncratic risk cannot be interpreted unambiguously 
as more prudent risk-taking, as it says nothing about whether the decreased risk is due to 
decreased upside or downside volatility.  
Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2015) models compensation incentives and bank 
risk-taking and suggests that introducing a CDS-based compensation component would 
improve bank managers’ risk-taking incentives and prevent excessive risk-taking.  The 
essence of their suggestion is to include some measure of downside tail risk in the 
compensation contracts.  Compared to symmetric risk measures such as total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk, downside tail risk is more appropriate as a proxy for imprudent risk-
taking, as it focuses on extreme losses.  This is crucial in the bank setting because 
regulators, while representing depositors and taxpayers, can suffer from the consequences 
of extremely poor bank performance (for example, a government bailout to prevent bank 
failure) but do not benefit as much from extremely good performance.  Therefore, 
looking at the relation between compensation and downside tail risk is suitable when 
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examining the effect of regulation on bank compensation contracts, although this 
distinction is not explicitly imposed by any rule in the regulations.  Bolton, Mehran, and 
Shapiro (2015) also shows that when the deposit insurance premium does not adjust 
dynamically with bank risk, including a penalty for downside tail risk is not in the best 
interest of shareholders, and would unlikely be implemented voluntarily by shareholder 
themselves.  If the new regulations are effective in correcting the imprudent risk-taking in 
compensation contracts designed by shareholders, I expect that banks start to penalize 
downside tail risk under the new regulations. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: The penalty for downside tail risk increases more from the pre-crisis period 
to the post-crisis period among large banks than small banks. 
Nevertheless, there is uncertainty about whether these changes would occur.  
According to Agarwal et al. (2014), the actual impact of regulations relies on both the 
regulations themselves and how they are enforced by regulators.  In the post-crisis period, 
the Guidance was effective, but Dodd-Frank Section 956 was not formally effective.  
Given this conflict and uncertainty about the final rules implementing Dodd-Frank 
Section 956, it is thus unclear how aggressively regulators would enforce the regulations 
on compensation contracts.  Even with effective rules, the enforcement can be weak or 
ineffective.  Weak enforcement may result from either regulators’ inability or 
unwillingness to enforce the regulations.  Executive compensation contracts are usually 
very complicate.  Hence, regulators may have limited resources to review each contract. 
Regulators may be unwilling to enforce regulations because they are captured by 
regulated banks.  The “revolving door” from Wall Street to Washington refers to the fact 
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that employees leave their jobs in regulatory agencies for executive positions in the banks 
being supervised and vice versa.  The financial press warns that the revolving door may 
dampen the independence of regulators and, hence, the effectiveness of regulations.15  
Three factors from banks’ side also contribute to regulators’ disadvantage in 
regulating compensation contracts.  The first factor is the discretion banks utilize in 
designing executive compensation contracts.  The regulations are generally principle-
based, which maintains great flexibility for banks in their compliance with regulations.  
There is no consensus on the best compensation arrangement that can fit all banks, so it is 
usually legitimate and common for each bank to tailor the compensation package to their 
own executive and bank characteristics.  This discretion exacerbates the friction of 
limited resources faced by regulators and prevent effective enforcement.  The second 
factor is the resistance from banks to make changes that are desired by regulators.  
Shareholders are traditionally the main force that shapes the executive compensation 
arrangements.  However, as discussed earlier, their goal of maximizing shareholder 
wealth does not necessarily align with regulators’ broader policy making goals that 
emphasize the long-term health of an organization.16   For example, Baron and Xiong 
(2016) documents the neglect of crash risk by bank shareholders in 20 developed 
countries during 1920-2012.  Beyond shareholders, managers may resist changes in 
compensation contracts because the regulations prohibit excessive compensation and 
                                                 
15  Several empirical studies actually find evidence that is inconsistent with the massive criticism 
from the media that the revolving door leads to more lenient supervision (e.g., Agarwal et al., 
2014; Lucca et al., 2014).  
16  Frankel, Kothari, and Zuo (2018) discuss the results of the objective of shareholder wealth 
maximization.  
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generally aim to make compensation more sensitive to bad risk outcomes, which clearly 
acts against managers’ self-interest.  Managers could resist changes by influencing boards 
or the selection of board members. For both of these reasons, banks may abuse the 
flexibility allowed under the regulations and not make meaningful changes.  The third 
factor is moral hazard arising from the possible government bail-out in times of extreme 
losses. Specifically, the “Too Big to Fail” doctrine may induce shareholders and boards 
of large banks to continue abusing the federal safety net. In this case, the expected 
changes may not occur among large banks. 
Finally, even if banks indeed changed their incentive compensation arrangements 
in the post-crisis period, I may not necessarily find a decrease in PPS or an increase in the 
penalty for downside tail risk.  Because the regulations do not implicitly dictate such 
changes, banks may use other ways to change their incentive compensation arrangements 
to comply with the regulations.  For example, banks can defer a larger portion of 
compensation to the future periods.  This can force bank managers to become creditors of 
banks and thus bear more costs for extremely bad risk outcomes.  Banks can also adopt 
clawback provisions and require the return of compensation should extremely bad 
performance occurs.  Both practices result in penalties for downside tail risk to the bank 
manager, but they cannot be detected by looking at the annual flow compensation.  Due 
to data availability issues, I cannot examine these practices.  But the existence of these 
alternative choices brings uncertainty to whether banks would change the pay for 
performance and penalty for downside tail risk in their CEO compensation contracts. 
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4. Empirical Models and Measurement of Variables 
I use a difference-in-differences research design to test the hypotheses and control 
for the effects of other concurrent regulatory changes.  Because large banks are the main 
group subject to the regulations, I partition the full bank sample into large banks and 
small banks, using the 2-digit SIC industry median total assets as the cutoff point.17  The 
large bank group is considered to be the more regulated (treated) group, and the small 
bank group serves as the control group.  
There are two typical models to test PPS in prior literature.  According to Hall and 
Liebman (1998) and Baker and Hall (2004), they differ in the assumption of whether the 
marginal product of managerial effort varies with firm size.  When the marginal product 
of managerial effort is proportionate to firm size, incentive should be measured by dollar 
value of equity ownership, and the firm performance should be stated as percentage 
change (e.g., stock returns).  When the marginal product of managerial effort is constant 
across firms of different size, incentive should be measured by percentage of equity 
ownership, and the firm performance should be stated as dollar change of shareholder 
wealth.  The former assumption is more appropriate for this study considering that large 
banks are generally the largest firms by book value of total assets in the US.  From the 
theoretical point of view, managers of large banks tend to put more efforts into activities 
                                                 
17  This method is simple and straightforward, but not precise.  Because the identification of 
larger banks is different under the Guidance and Dodd-Frank Act, I use industry median total 
assets at the beginning of year as the cutoff point for my main results to avoid the 
complication.  In addition, I use two other identification methods: the industry median total 
assets at the beginning of the post-crisis period and total assets of 50 billion dollars (threshold 
of larger banks under Dodd-Frank Act) as alternative cutoff points in the robustness tests and 
the results are similar to the main results. 
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that can have system-wide effect (proportionate to firm size) rather than fixed effect. 
From an empirical perspective, the assumption that the effect of managerial efforts varies 
with firm size is more consistent with practice.  Bad managerial behavior in large banks 
is likely more detrimental to the economy than that in small banks, so large banks always 
get more scrutiny from regulators in reality. For these reasons, I choose the following 
specification:  
𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡   =    𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡                                   
+ 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                                                                                                   (Eq.1) 
Following prior studies, I use CEO total flow compensation as the main 
dependent variable instead of CEOs’ firm-specific wealth (Kleymenova and Tuna, 2018; 
Cerasi et al., 2017).  Because the relatively short post period for this study does not allow 
boards to significantly alter the stock of equity incentives built up over many annual 
contracts, it is more appropriate to look at the flow compensation, since it is a cleaner 
reflection of changes in the compensation contract.18  
Post is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-crisis period (2011–2015) 
                                                 
18 I focus on total compensation instead of individual pay components due to two considerations.  
First, it provides a comprehensive picture of compensation practices.  Second, there seems to 
be a structural change (from stock options to restricted stocks) in executive compensation 
practices following the implementation of FAS 123R in 2006. 
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and zero for the pre-crisis period (2003–2007).  I use stock returns as the performance 
measure.  Albuquerque, Chen, Dong and Riedl (2019) suggests that stock returns are 
more informative than accounting earnings in reflecting the effect of managerial actions 
on future profitability.   
I predict that 𝛼6 < 0, indicating that the decrease of PPS is greater for large 
(treated) banks than small (control) banks. Similarly, I expect 𝛼10 < 0, suggesting a 
greater increase in the penalty for downside tail risk in the post-crisis period for large 
(treated) banks than small (control) banks. 
I use three proxies for downside tail risk, 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, in this study.19  The first 
proxy is the probability of bankruptcy. Hillegeist et al. (2004) compare two accounting-
based measures (the Altman Z-Score and the Ohlson O-Score) with a market-based 
measure based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model, BSMProb.  This market-based 
measure essentially views equity as a European call option on firms’ assets.  Firms go 
bankrupt where the (estimated) market value of assets is lower than the face value of total 
liabilities.20  The authors find that BSMProb is more informative than the two accounting-
based measures.  On the other hand, Hillegeist et al. (2004) find that BSMProb also 
suffers from some unrealistic model assumptions, resulting in upward biased estimation 
on the probability of bankruptcy compared to the real bankruptcy rate.  Therefore, I also 
                                                 
19  Measures of tail risk can be indicative of future stock returns, but the sign seems to depend on 
the exact return measures used. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) document a positive 
association between default risk and expected future returns; while prior studies, such as 
Dichev (1998), find a negative association when using realized stock returns.  
20  Using BSM model to estimate the probability of bankruptcy can apply to financial firms.  For 
example, Bushman and Williams (2012) also use Black-Scholes-Merton model to calculate the 
fair value of the deposit insurance put option for banks. 
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use two other downside tail risk measures, Tail5 and MES (marginal expected shortfall), 
based on realized stock returns, following Bushman, Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2018).  
Tail5 uses a firm’s lowest 5% daily returns during a fiscal year; MES uses a firms’ daily 
returns when the market experiences the worst 5% daily returns during a fiscal year.  
Thus, Tail5 reflects the standalone tail risk, while MES measures a bank’s tail risk 
exposure to market-wide downturns, similar to stress tests conducted in the banking 
sector.  Bushman et al. (2018) finds that banks with materialistic CEOs have worse risk-
management functions and higher tail risk exposure. One possible drawback of Tail5 is 
that it may be correlated with contemporaneous stock return, so the tests of H2 may not 
be as powerful since (Eq 1) controls for contemporaneous returns.  I multiply the raw 
measures of Tail5 and MES by negative one so that higher values for all three downside 
tail risk measures, BSMProb, Tail5, and MES, indicate higher levels of tail risk.21  
I follow prior literature and control for the major factors that affect the level of 
CEO compensation, including total risk, firm size, market-to-book ratio, CEO-board 
chair duality, and CEO tenure.  I choose to use total risk instead of its idiosyncratic risk 
component for two reasons.  First, the literature on pay for luck shows that systematic 
                                                 
21  It should be noted that this study is distinct from the stream of literature examining the ex post 
settling up of cash compensation (Leone, Shuang, and Zimmerman, 2006; Shaw and Zhang, 
2010; Albuquerque et al., 2019, among others).  These studies generally test whether the PPS 
of cash compensation is asymmetric and whether cash compensation adjusts more for 
unrealized losses (proxied by negative returns) than for unrealized profits (proxied by positive 
returns).  Unrealized losses and downside tail risk are two related but different concepts.  
According to Albuquerque et al. (2019), the tests of asymmetric PPS should be done within 
the incentive zone, excluding the two tails of performance distribution; while I specifically 
focus on the downside tail of the performance distribution in this study.  To further distinguish 
between pay for performance and the penalty for downside tail risk, I always include both 
performance and downside tail risk in my regressions. 
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risk also matters for setting compensation in practice.22  Second, the tail risk measures do 
not distinguish between idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk.  Excluding the systematic 
risk component in the control would bring omitted variable bias to the estimates of tail 
risk.  In addition to stock return-based total risk, I include leverage as it is normally 
viewed as a risk measure for banks.  Also, leverage is found to be higher in larger banks 
than in smaller banks, and higher in financial firms than in non-financial firms, so 
controlling for leverage is necessary when comparing these groups.  I use the logarithm 
of total book assets as the proxy for firm size, instead of the commonly used measure of 
market value of equity.  Because banks usually have higher debt than equity, total assets 
may serve as a better proxy, because it includes both debt and equity.23  Also, I include 
asset growth rate because it closely resembles loan growth rate, which can signal 
imprudent risk-taking and poor future performance (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz, 
2018).24  Finally, I do not include some controls that are usually used in non-financial 
firms, such as the cash flow shortfall and an indicator for an operating loss, because they 
do not apply in the bank setting.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.   
Because the assignment of large and small banks is not random, the two groups 
are not comparable in many dimensions, such as size and CEO compensation level.  To 
mitigate the concern that the small banks may not serve as a good control group for large 
banks, I test for the parallel trend between these two groups in the pre-crisis period.  
                                                 
22  The pay for luck literature generally suggests that executives are paid for good lucky events, 
but not penalized for bad luck. See for example, Garvey and Milbourn (2006). 
23  Cheng et al. (2015) use both the market value of equity and total assets as proxies for size and 
find similar results. 
24  Results are similar in terms of significance level without controlling for the asset growth rate. 
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Because many other factors could have impact on the compensation contracts in the 
banking sector, I run a few falsification tests to eliminate some possible treatment factors.   
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Sample and Summary Statistics 
Table 1 describes the sample selection process for the full bank sample.  
Following prior literature, firms with SIC code from 6000 to 6299 are classified as banks, 
including both commercial banks and investment banks. Both types of banks are subject 
to the regulation of Dodd-Frank Section 956 in the post-crisis period.  The sample starts 
from 2003 so that firms have implemented the changes required by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX). Also, the period of 2008–2010 is characterized by temporary 
turbulence and regulations in the banking sector, so this period is not included in my 
sample period.25  The new compensation regulations started in 2010.  Therefore, I rely on 
fiscal years from 2003 to 2007 as the pre-crisis period, and fiscal years from 2011 to 
2015 as the post-crisis period. 
<Table 1> 
I get compensation, CEO tenure, and CEO-board chair duality data from 
ExecuComp, financial data from Compustat, and stock return data from CRSP.26  
                                                 
25  There are some dramatic (albeit temporary) changes to CEO compensation during this period.  
For example, CEO of Citigroup Inc., Mr Vikram Pandit, received $125,001 of salary (only 1/8 
of his previous year salary) and no incentive compensation for 2009; in 2010 he received only 
$1 of salary and no other forms of compensation.  The compensation of other named 
executives of Citigroup Inc have not experienced as dramatic changes in the same periods.  
26  Very few CEOs have missing tenure or negative tenure. One reason for reporting negative 
tenure can be that the same person became CEO for the same firm a second time, and 
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Following the literature, I require a firm to have at least 126 days of return data available 
during each fiscal year to calculate market-based risk measures.  The Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 established the Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(“TARP”), which imposes constraints on executive compensation at the banks who 
received capital infusion from TARP (“TARP participants”).27  These constraints are 
temporary in nature, because they apply to TARP participants only when they have 
outstanding balance from TARP funds.  I hand collect TARP fund data from the website 
https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list. I first check whether a bank received funds 
from TARP that it needs to pay back.28  TARP fund injection was typically made in the 
end of 2008 and beginning of 2009. I then collect data on when the TARP participants 
made their final TARP fund repayment.  Most TARP participants fully repaid the TARP 
fund in 2009, but a few banks took longer time.  I exclude bank-year observations for a 
TARP participant that has an outstanding TARP fund balance at the beginning of a fiscal 
year so that my dataset is not affected by the compensation regulations imposed by 
TARP. 
Some banks filed for bankruptcy and disappeared, and other reorganize as new 
banks in the post-crisis period.  To address the survivorship bias, I use balanced samples 
                                                 
ExecuComp updates the “becameceo” data as the most recent date when the person became 
CEO, resulting in negative tenure for his or her previous years as CEO.  I manually check and 
correct these tenure data by using information from firms’ proxy statements. 
27  Core and Guay (2010) discusses typical constraints from TARP: prohibition of stock option 
awards and severance payment, limits on cash bonus and restricted stock awards for both the 
level and in proportion to annual total compensation.  Also, see for example, the discussion of 
the TARP constraints in the 2013 proxy statement of Seacoast Banking Corp (ticker SBCF).  
28  Some assistance fund from TARP are subsidies that are not required to be paid back.  Because 
these kinds of TARP fund do not put constraints on compensation, I do not consider the 
financial institutions who only received these funds to be TARP participants.  
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by requiring each bank to exist in both the pre- and post-crisis period. The final sample 
includes 116 unique banks and 940 bank-year observations.   
Stock return is a common performance metric in compensation contracts.  But 
little is known about the extent to which risk is incorporated in compensation contracts.  
To examine this, I look into the detailed performance metrics information in CEO 
compensation contracts provided by IncentiveLab.  This dataset includes only one half of 
the sample firms in ExecuComp, generally the larger ones.  Nevertheless, looking into the 
explicit compensation contracts provides more direct evidence on the contracting role of 
risk int the compensation contracts.  I search the key word “risk” in the performance 
metrics.  Then I examine the percentage of firms with risk-related performance metrics 
for each year in the sample. 
<Figure 1> 
Figure 1 displays the time trend in banks and insurance firms, respectively.  I use 
insurance firms as a comparison since risk is of similar importance to them.  For banks, 
the usage of risk-related performance metrics demonstrates a general upward trend, 
especially in the post-crisis period.  This provides direct evidence that more banks start to 
consider risk when designing their CEO’s compensation contracts.  On the other side, for 
insurance firms, the percentage of firms with risk-related performance metrics fluctuates 
and stays at a relatively low level in the post-crisis period.  This is consistent with the 
regulations on compensation mostly focusing on (and thus affecting) banks. 
I winsorize all continuous independent variables at the 1th and 99th percentiles 
within each 2-digit SIC code industry and fiscal year, except for the downside tail risk 
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measures and the logarithm of CEO tenure.  Downside tail risk, by design, measures 
extreme events, so winsorization may severely reduce the information content of these 
proxies.  Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the large bank and small bank 
group. The level of CEO compensation and total assets different a lot between these two 
groups. On the other hand, they share similar and similar changes to total risk, market-to-
book ratio and asset growth rate. 
<Figure 2> 
The time trend of CEO compensation is presented in Figure 2.  In general, total 
compensation of large banks fluctuates more than total compensation of small banks in 
both the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period, primarily due to the fluctuations in 
the cash compensation component.  The level of CEO compensation is higher for large 
banks than for small banks, though this difference appears smaller in the post-crisis 
period. 
<Figure 3> 
As for the time trend and level of stock return performance, large banks and small 
banks almost mimic each other during both the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period, as 
shown in Figure 3.  For both groups, the stock market performance deteriorates in the 
pre-crisis period, recovers quick in the first half of the post-crisis period and deteriorates 
again thereafter.  Correspondingly, all three downside risk measures demonstrate the 
opposite pattern, as shown in Figure 4.  
<Figure 4> 
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Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the main variables used in the tests. 
Panel A looks at the large bank sample and tests for the changes in the variables in the 
post-crisis period.  Total CEO compensation, leverage, market-to-book ratio, and the 
asset growth rate all decrease after the crisis.  Risk, including total risk and downside tail 
risk, increases slightly, which is likely due to the high levels of risk at the beginning of 
the post-crisis period, as shown in Figure 4.  Panel B looks at the small banks sample.  
Total compensation shows a slight increase, and CEO tenure becomes longer in the post 
crisis period.  The other variables generally demonstrate similar changes among small 
banks as among large banks.  Panel C compares the large banks and the small banks in 
both the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period.  Other than stock return, many of the 
variables exhibit significant differences: total compensation, total risk, size, leverage, 
market-to-book ratio, and CEO duality.  The differences in downside tail risk are more 
significant in the post-crisis period.  The last column shows the difference-in-differences 
of the variables.  The differences between these two groups in total compensation, 
market-to-book ratio, assets growth rate, and CEO duality become smaller in the post-
crisis period, whereas the differences in CEO tenure become larger.  The differences in 
downside tail risk show mixed results. 
<Table 2> 
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlation between variables.  Consistent with prior 
literature, CEO compensation is positively associated with contemporaneous returns, firm 
size and CEO-board chair duality.  As for risk measures, compensation is negatively 
associated with total risk.  The correlation between compensation and downside tail risk 
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is mixed, and the correlation between return and downside tail risk is negative and 
significant.  Out of the three downside tail risk measures, BSMProb has relatively low 
correlation with the stock return and total risk; whereas Tail5 has higher correlation with 
both of them, so part of the effect could be captured by return and total risk.  Within risk 
measures, including total risk and downside tail risk, the correlation is always positive.  
<Table 3> 
5.2 Main Results 
Table 4 tests H1 and H2 using the difference-in-differences regression design.  
Firm fixed effects are included in both regressions. I find strong evidence that the PPS for 
CEOs of large banks decreased more than that of small banks, supporting H1. Out of the 
three downside tail risk measures, two have shown evidence for greater increase in the 
penalty for downside tail risk for CEOs of large banks than for CEOs of small banks, 
consistent with the prediction in H2.  The insignificant results for Tail5 may be attributed 
to the fact that Tail5 is correlated with stock return and total risk, and thus it is more 
difficult to make precise estimations for the coefficient.  In general, the results as a whole 
are consistent with the notion that the new regulations likely brought about changes to the 
incentive design of CEO compensation contracts among large banks. In addition, the 
coefficients for Post and the interaction between Post and Treated suggest a significant 
increase to the level of CEO compensation among both large banks and small banks, after 
controlling for other determinant factors. 
<Table 4> 
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To confirm that the observed results are due to changes in compensation contracts 
at large banks but not at the small banks, I examine the changes in PPS and the penalty 
for downside tail risk within each subsample.  Results are presented in Table 5.  For the 
large bank sample, PPS is significantly weaker in the post-period while the penalty for 
downside tail risk is significantly stronger in the post-crisis period, as shown in columns 
(1), (3), and (5). Interestingly, the positive and significant coefficient on downside tail 
risk is consistent with large banks rewarding CEOs for downside tail risk in the pre-crisis 
period. This is clearly incompatible with effective risk control and supports regulators’ 
concerns about inappropriate compensation practices within banks.  It also helps bolster 
the legitimacy of the proposed regulations.  F-tests (untabulated) among large banks 
show that PPS is not significantly different from zero in the post-crisis period; the penalty 
for downside tail risk in the post-crisis period, however, depends on the measure: it is 
statistically significant when using BSMProb but not when using Tail5 and MES.   
<Table 5> 
None of the changes occur among small banks, as shown in columns (2), (4) and 
(6).  Also note that there is no significant pay-for-performance among small banks in the 
pre-crisis period. On the other end, there is even weak evidence of penalty for downside 
tail risk among small banks in the pre-crisis period, as shown in column (2). This is 
consistent with regulators’ view that small banks do not suffer from the same degree of 
incentive compensation problems as large banks, and, thus, not their focus.  This may 
also suggest fundamental differences in compensation contracts between large and small 
banks.   
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To alleviate the concern that the small bank group may not serve as a good 
control for the large bank group, I test for the parallel trend of pay-for-performance and 
penalty for downside tail risk between large banks and small banks in the pre-crisis 
period. Due to the relatively small sample size and the exogenous shock of compensation 
disclosure in 2006, I conduct a falsification test to see whether the changes in pay-for-
performance and penalty for downside tail risk around 2006 vary across the large bank 
and small bank groups. Results in Table 6 do not support divergent trend between these 
two groups in the pre-crisis period.  
<Table 6> 
Taken together, the results from Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 suggest that the new 
regulations have been effective in correcting regulators’ pre-crisis concerns about CEO 
incentive compensation arrangements.  There is strong evidence that CEO compensation 
contracting in large banks shifted away from promoting performance and towards 
limiting downside tail risk as a result of the new regulations.  
5.3 Falsification Tests 
5.3.1 Other Possible Treatments 
The new regulations clearly define regulated institutions and explicitly focus on 
large banks.  This is why I use bank size to identify treated banks.  However, the research 
design may omit variables correlated with pay, performance, and downside tail risk that 
are the real drivers of the changes documented in the Section 5.2.  In the following tests, I 
try to rule out three alternative explanations for the observed changes in PPS and penalty 
for downside tail risk.  
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<Table 7> 
First, TARP experience may be driving the results of both PPS and penalty for 
downside tail risk.  TARP-participating banks are subject to executive compensation 
restrictions. Furthermore, the Office of the Special Master reviewed and approved their 
executive compensation payments to ensure the interests of shareholders and taxpayers.  
Although I exclude bank-year observations that fall directly under TARP constraints, 
influence from TARP experience may stay for a few more years.  Because shareholders 
and directors could learn from the experience under TARP restrictions, compensation 
contracting in the post-crisis period may not become exactly as it was in the pre-crisis 
period.  To address this concern, I partition the full bank sample based on TARP 
participation, classifying TARP participants as the treated group and non-TARP 
participants as the control group.  I then test whether defining TARP participation as the 
treatment produces similar results in the difference-in-differences regressions.  The 
results in the first three columns of Table 7 do not support this conjecture.  TARP 
participants don’t demonstrate higher changes in PPS or penalty for downside tail risk 
relative to non-TARP participants.  Therefore, TARP participation does not seem to drive 
the changes observed in the main analysis.  
Another possible cause of the changes in PPS may be self-correction in the post-
crisis period initiated by shareholders and directors.  For example, the implementation of 
say-on-pay practices may pressure directors to make changes to alleviate the agency 
problem in the years from 2011.  Thus, the changes in compensation contracting in the 
post-crisis period may vary cross-sectionally with the magnitude of changes initiated by 
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shareholders and directors. When firm risk is realized in the concentrated period of crisis, 
banks with inferior stock market performance may be considered to be more problematic 
in their incentive contracting, given the direct link between compensation incentives and 
risk-taking.  For their shareholders and directors, one solution at hand is to alter 
incentives from compensation contracts. As a result, these banks can demonstrate greater 
changes.29  I use the buy-and-hold stock return during the crisis period as a proxy for the 
extent of risk taken.  I then use the 2-digit SIC code industry median as the cutoff point to 
identify poorer performing banks, who presumably have greater agency problem in the 
pre-crisis period and more significant changes in the post crisis period. Column (4), (5) 
and (6) of Table 7 present the results.  There is no evidence of greater changes in pay-for-
performance; and only BSMProb shows weak result on greater penalty for downside tail 
risk in the poorer performing banks.  The results reinforce the inference from Section 5.2 
that regulations rather than market forces are associated with these changes in incentive 
compensation. 
Lastly, Cerasi et al. (2017) examines a sample of the largest banks in several 
jurisdictions (including US) that are likely subject to similar compensation regulations in 
the post-crisis years. This paper finds that changes in bank CEOs’ compensation 
contracts occur mostly among investment banks, as opposed to commercial banks. This 
can be true in the US setting because investment banks were very lightly regulated in the 
                                                 
29  Another possibility can be boards’ overreaction to the regulations.  First, the principal-agency 
problem may cause boards and bank managers to not always act for the best interest of 
shareholders.  Second, any sanction from regulators can cause magnificent damage to the firm 
and reputation of directors and managers.  Therefore, the expected changes may be more likely 
to occur within firms of severe principal-agency problems.  
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pre-crisis period, but since 2008 the regulation of investment banks started to become 
stricter and converge to the regulation of commercial banks. Therefore, investment banks 
have experienced bigger regulatory shock than commercial banks, and the observed 
changes in PPS and penalty for downside tail risk may come from investment banks, 
rather than large banks. However, results from empirical tests in Column (5), (6) and (7) 
only provide weak evidence on greater changes in the penalty for downside tail risk and 
no evidence for greater changes in PPS. Thus, the more stringent regulation for 
investment banks does not seem to be driving the results documented in the Section 5.2. 
5.3.2 Measures of Upside Tail Potential  
The two tails of stock return distribution likely correlate with each other.  That is, 
a firm with higher downside tail risk may well have higher upside tail potential.  Thus, 
higher downside tail risk may actually proxy for higher upside tail potential, and the 
stronger penalty for downside tail risk may be a reflection of weaker reward for upside 
tail.  To rule out this possibility, I use similar methods to construct two upside tail 
measures and replace the downside tail risk measures in Equation (1) with these upside 
tail measures.  I then run both the difference-in-differences tests and the pre-post tests, 
similar to Table 4 and Table 5.  The regression results are presented in Table 8.  Panel A 
provides weak evidence of greater decrease in the pay for upside tail, as shown in 
Column (2).  However, a further look at the large and small bank subsamples does not 
provide evidence of a decrease in the pay for upside tail among large banks, as shown in 
Column (2) and (4) of Panel B.  Therefore, it is not likely that a decreased reward for 
upside tail potential is driving the results documented in Section 5.2. 
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<Table 8> 
5.3.3 Other Risk Measures 
Cerasi et al. (2017) finds a greater increase in the penalty associated with total 
risk for banks that are subject to similar post-crisis regulations, compared to unaffected 
banks.  However, the interpretation of the coefficient on total risk is ambiguous.  From a 
theoretical point of view, it makes more sense that regulations would treat upside and 
downside risk differently rather than equivalently, because regulators or governments 
have asymmetric payoffs from risk.  They can suffer unlimited losses from extreme 
negative outcomes at banks, but only have limited gain from banks’ profits after extreme 
positive outcomes.  For example, FDIC collects a relatively constant premium from 
insured banks for providing deposit insurance.  If a bank fails, FDIC have to recover the 
losses of depositors up to at least $250,000 per depositor, per bank, per ownership 
category.  Further, total risk does not distinguish between normal risk-taking and 
imprudent risk-taking, so it is hard to argue that the effect of the regulations improves 
economic growth (limiting tail risk from the downside) or hinders it (forgoing risky 
positive NPV projects with huge upside potential).  
Because all the downside tail risk measures are positively associated with total 
risk, as shown in Table 3, it is possible that there is penalty for total risk too. To make 
sure the observed results on penalty for downside tail risk are not driven by penalty for 
total risk, I control for lagged total risk in all the regressions.  To further rule out the 
possibility that the results on increased penalty for downside tail is merely a reflection of 
increased penalty for total risk that is documented by Cerasi et al. (2017), I use 
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contemporaneous total risk to replace the proxies for downside tail risk and rerun the tests 
in (Eq 1).  Column (1) of Table 9 provides the difference-in-differences results from this 
analysis. The insignificant coefficient for the three-way tail risk interaction does not 
support this conjecture.  
<Table 9> 
In addition to total risk, I try three other risk measures that can possibly be 
contracted upon. Similarly, I replace the downside tail with these different risk measures: 
leverage, crash risk and systemic risk.  Leverage is very easy to monitor. Higher leverage 
indicates lower equity buffer to absorb losses, and thus losses are more easily transferred 
to creditors. Column (2) of Table 9 don’t show differential changes in the penalty for 
leverage. Crash risk is usually related to managers hiding bad news. In the bank setting 
where financial reporting involves enormous management discretion, shareholders may 
want to put disincentive on bad news hoarding. Column (3) does not find supporting 
evidence.  I also test whether there is more scrutiny over systemic risk, which refers to 
the harm to the whole financial sector from the distress of a single bank.  Larger banks 
tend to have higher systemic risk.  It is possible that the new regulations actually limit 
systemic risk rather than downside tail risk.  Results are presented in column (4) of Table 
9.  There is no evidence of significantly larger penalties for systemic risk between large 
banks and small banks during the post-crisis period. 
5.4 Robustness Tests 
To test for the robustness of the main results, I change a few parameters of the 
empirical model and rerun the tests. 
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5.4.1 Alternative Fixed Effects 
I use firm fixed effects in all the previous regressions. To test whether the results 
in Table 4 hold under different fixed effects, I also test the hypotheses using industry 
fixed effects.  Results are presented in Panel A of Table 10. They are similar to the results 
using firm fixed effects.  
<Table 10> 
SIC industry code may not well depict the businesses of banks, especially when a 
bank has multiple lines of business.  Alternatively, the type of financial institutions may 
provide more information on their business and legal structure. When I control for 
institution type fixed effects, I find similar results too, as shown in Panel B.   
In addition, the charter of a US financial institution determines which regulator is 
the primary regulator of the bank.  The choice of bank charter should take into account 
many factors, regulation burden being one of them. One problem arising from the current 
US banking regulatory structure is “regulator shopping”, a phenomenon that financial 
institutions choose and switch to the regulator that best suits their needs. When financial 
institutions switch to a more accommodating regulator, the enforcement of regulations is 
undermined. To address the concern arising from regulator shopping in the post-crisis 
period, I control for regulator fixed effects and rerun the tests. The results still hold, as 
evidenced in Panel C.30   
                                                 
30  Rosen (2005) looks at the phenomena of US banks switching federal regulators from 1977–
2003.  94% of the switches occurred among small banks (total assets < 1 billion).  This would 
make the cross-sectional variation between larger banks versus smaller banks more prominent.  
I don't think this kind of arbitrage would be common in my sample, because my sample is 
comprised of the largest financial institutions, and the benefits from being a national bank or a 
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5.4.2 Alternative Control Group 
Due to the significant differences between large banks and small banks, one may 
question whether the latter may serve as a good control group for what would have 
happened to PPS and penalty for downside tail risk among large banks if there were no 
regulatory interventions in the post-crisis period.  Because insurance firms have similar 
business models but are not subject to the set of regulations examined, I use US insurance 
firms as an alternative control group for large banks.  Panel A in Table 11 presents the 
difference-in-differences results.  The results on PPS hold, and the results on penalty for 
downside tail risk are similar but weaker.  Similar to Table 6, I also check the parallel 
trend between large banks and insurance firms in the pre-crisis period.  The parallel trend 
assumption is violated when using BSMProb as a measure for downside tail risk.  Thus, 
insurance firms may not serve as a good control at least for the test of penalty for 
downside tail risk, and one needs to interpret the results in Panel A with caution. 
<Table 11> 
5.4.3 Alternative Identification of Large Banks 
In the main analysis, I use the beginning-of-year industry median total assets as 
the cutoff point to identify large banks to be more regulated relative to small banks.  On 
one hand, this method has the advantage of simplicity, because the cutoff points per the 
Guidance and Dodd-Frank Act are not exactly the same, which brings a layer of 
complication to the identification of more regulated banks. On the other hand, this 
                                                 
holding company should be more attractive to them than changing charter to reduce regulation 
costs. 
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method is not accurate in identifying the more regulated banks.  Because the median 
value of total assets is well below the cutoff point ($50 billion) in Dodd-Frank Act, it 
likely brings attenuation bias to the expected difference-in-difference results because it 
tends to misclassifies some less regulated banks as being subject to more regulations.31  
Hence the validity of the results is not harmed by choosing this method.  Nevertheless, it 
may still be appealing to check the robustness of the results for alternative cutoff points.  
Therefore, I apply two different methods to classify large banks.  First, I use the median 
of the bank’s total assets at the beginning of the post-crisis period to identify a constant 
large bank group.  Second, I use total assets of 50 billion dollars as an alternative cutoff 
point, according to the Dodd-Frank Act, to identify large banks.  I rerun all the 
regressions in Table 4 and present the results in Table 12.  The results still hold under 
these two alternative identification methods of large banks.  Moreover, the penalty for 
downside tail risk results are stronger because all the three downside tail risk measures 
now show significant coefficients. 
<Table 12> 
5.4.4 Additional Controls 
Risk management in banks receives much more attention since the 2007–2008 
crisis. Accordingly, risk officer may be put in a more prominent position in the post-crisis 
period, compared to the pre-crisis period. Many banks have adopted formal procedures to 
involve risk officers in designing the executive compensation contracts. To examine 
                                                 
31  This can be inferred from the fact that the median total assets for large banks in the post-crisis 
period (in Table 2) is about 42 billion dollars, which is below the 50 billion cutoff point for 
large banks under Dodd-Frank Act. 
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whether this explains the results documented earlier, I control for the existence of a risk 
officer among the five highest paid executives. The results still hold, as shown in Column 
(1), (3), and (5) of Table 13.  
<Table 13> 
Core and Guay (1999) demonstrates that among non-financial firms, CEO flow 
compensation is granted to bring the incentives from the CEOs’ total portfolio back to the 
optimal level.  Although there is no direct evidence showing a similar phenomenon 
occurs in the financial sector, there is also no evidence refuting such a possibility.  As a 
result, I also control for lagged level of CEO incentives from the portfolio of all stock and 
option grants and rerun the tests in Table 4.  I use the dollar change of executive wealth 
for one percentage change in firm value (Coles, Daniel, Naveen, 2006) as the measure of 
incentives.32  Including this additional control decreases the sample size slightly.  The 
results are similar to Table 4, as shown in column (2), (4) and (6) of Table 13. 
5.4.5 Removing Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions have always been very active in the US banking sector. 
Around the recent crisis, these likely occur more often. Announcement of merger and 
acquisitions typically would result in sudden and unusual fluctuations on the stock prices 
of acquirers. If a deal is completed, executive compensation may be adjusted accordingly 
to reflect the value of managing a larger and more complex organization. To rule out the 
                                                 
32  Incentives can be expressed in different ways. According to Baker and Hall (2004), the 
sensitivity of CEOs’ firm related wealth to percentage change in firm value corresponds to the 
regression model using stock return as the performance measure; while the sensitivity of 
wealth change to dollar change in firm value corresponds to the regression model using dollar 
change in firm value as the performance measure.  
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effect of mergers and acquisitions, I construct a balanced sample with no merger and 
acquisition announcements. The new sample is much smaller with only 559 firm-year 
observations. However, the results still hold within this restricted sample, suggesting that 
merger and acquisitions are not driving the main results. 
<Table 14> 
5.4.6 Restricted Sample 
One way to make the large banks and small banks more comparable is to restrict 
the sample firms in a certain size range.  Because Dodd-Frank Act provides total assets of 
$50 billion as the cutoff point for more stringent requirements, a natural choice would be 
to compare banks above and below $50 billion of total assets.  Accordingly, I choose 
banks with total assets between $30 billion and $70 billion to balance between the 
similarity of the two groups of banks and the number of observations in the sample.  The 
restricted sample has 115 firm-year observations.  Due to the smaller sample size and 
greater comparability between treated and control banks, I run difference-in-differences 
tests excluding the control variables and report the results in Table 15.  Throughout 
different measures of downside tail risk, no evidence is found for greater changes in PPS 
and penalty for downside tail risk among large banks.   
<Table 15> 
The small sample size may be one contributing factor for the null results.  
Another factor may be that banks actively manage the amount of total assets around the 
cutoff point.  As bank managers know that exceeding the cutoff point will expose banks 
to more stringent regulatory requirements, bank managers may have incentives to manage 
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their assets downwards to avoid regulation.  Figure 5 plots distributions of total assets for 
banks as well as for insurance firms around the $50 billion cutoff point in the pre- and the 
post-crisis periods.  If banks anticipated and actively tried to manage total assets as a way 
to avoid regulation, then there should be an excess of banks with total assets just under 
the $50 billion cutoff in the post-crisis period.  Figure 5 shows that for banks, the size 
distribution around $50 billion cutoff in the pre-crisis period is relatively smooth.  There 
are 22 observations in the total assets range of $35–$50 billion, and 17 observations in 
the total assets range of $50–$65 billion.  However, in the post-crisis period there are 30 
observations in the $35–$50 billion range, and only 10 observations in the $50–$65 
billion range.  This suggests that a number of banks could have manipulated their total 
assets below $50 billion to avoid being subject to stricter regulations.  The frequency 
change around the $50 billion total assets cutoff is not evidenced for insurance firms, 
suggesting that any potential downward size manipulation is more likely due to some 
unique factors in the banking sector, rather than common shocks to banks and insurance 
firms. 
<Figure 5> 
5.5 Additional Analysis 
5.5.1 Compensation Components 
As prior literature shows that different components of compensation can provide 
different incentives (Bennett et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2015), I look into two components of 
CEO compensation: cash compensation and equity compensation.  I run similar tests as 
those in Table 4 to but replace the dependent variable of total CEO compensation with 
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cash compensation and equity compensation, respectively.  Table 16 tabulates the 
difference-in-differences results.  Panel A shows that the results on PPS and penalty for 
downside tail risk are present in cash compensation; Panel B shows results on PPS, but 
not on the penalty for downside tail risk.  In other words, greater decrease in PPS among 
large banks is driven by both the cash compensation and equity compensation; while 
greater increase in the penalty for downside tail risk is driven by the cash compensation 
component only.  This suggests that boards are more likely to cut cash bonus when 
extremely bad outcomes occur. 
<Table 16> 
5.5.2 CFO Compensation 
Both the Guidance and the Dodd-Frank Section 956 require banks to identify 
employees who can expose the organization to significant amounts of risk.  While there is 
some degree of ambiguity, the employees covered by the Guidance include, at a 
minimum, “named officers” subject to SEC compensation disclosure requirements for 
public firms.33  Therefore, similar changes should occur among non-CEO executives.  In 
the following additional analysis, I examine bank CFOs’ compensation contracts.  I rerun 
all the tests in Table 4 using the total compensation of bank CFOs as the dependent 
variable.  The results in Table 17 show a similar pattern for CFOs regarding the penalty 
for downside tail risk.  However, the results for PPS are much weaker for CFOs, though 
                                                 
33  The covered persons under Dodd-Frank Act Section 956 (proposed rule 2011) also include 
executive officers, defined as persons who hold the titles or perform the function of at least 
one of the following positions: president, chief executive officer, executive chairman, chief 
operating officer, chief financial officer, chief investment officer, chief legal officer, chief 
lending officer, chief risk officer, or head of a major business line. 
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qualitatively similar.  This may reflect that CFOs generally receive a lower proportion of 
incentive compensation than CEOs (Indjejikian and Matejka, 2009).   
<Table 17> 
 
6. Conclusion 
The 2007–2008 financial crisis raised public concerns about the incentives of 
banks’ executives.  As a result, regulators started to pressure banks to improve their 
incentive compensation contracts as the crisis abated.  In mid-2010, four federal bank 
regulators jointly issued the Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies (the 
“Guidance”).  According to the Guidance, the incentive compensation arrangements 
should balance risk and reward, be compatible with effective control and risk 
management, and be supported by strong corporate governance.  In early 2011, more 
detailed rules were proposed under Dodd-Frank Section 956, aiming to regulate 
employee incentive compensation so that the incentive compensation is not excessive and 
does not encourage imprudent risk-taking.  
This paper studies whether the new compensation regulations affect the incentives 
provided by CEO compensation contracts.  Specifically, it examines how the relation 
between pay and performance and the relation between pay and downside tail risk 
changes from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period as a result of the regulatory changes 
introduced after the financial crisis.  I find that there is a greater decrease in PPS and a 
greater increase in the penalty for downside tail risk among large banks in the post-crisis 
period, compared to small banks.  I conduct a series of falsification tests to rule out 
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alternative explanations to my main findings.  This includes different identification 
methods of treated banks and different risk measures.  No supporting evidence is 
documented.  I also run several robustness tests and the results always hold.  A further 
look into the components of compensation shows that the greater decrease in PPS among 
large banks is driven by both the cash and equity components, whereas the greater 
increase in the penalty for downside tail risk is driven by cash compensation only.  
Lastly, I examine CFO compensation and find similar results on penalty for downside tail 
risk but much weaker results on PPS. 
The results as a whole provide evidence for the effectiveness of new regulations 
on CEO compensation contracts in banks.  In the pre-crisis period, CEOs of large banks 
appear to be rewarded for downside tail risk, a sign that compensation contracts 
encouraged CEOs to engage in imprudent risk-taking.  This problem disappears after the 
new regulations, suggesting significant improvement in compensation contracts from 
regulators’ perspective. 
This study is also closely related to the ongoing debate on regulating 
compensation in the financial sector and the law-making process to implement it.  In 
2016, regulators proposed more detailed and stringent rules in Dodd-Frank Section 956, 
provoking much more virulent responses arguing the regulations are not appropriate.  
One of the criticisms of the new rules is that they may harm the ability of banks to attract 
and retain top employees.34  According to the rule making agenda published by the 
                                                 
34  Other studies offer comprehensive discussions about the impact of different regulations on 
compensation in the post-crisis period, for example, Core and Guay, 2010; Murphy and 
Jensen, 2018. 
  
48 
Federal Reserve, Dodd-Frank Section 956 did not enter into the final rule stage but was 
moved to the “Long-Term Actions” section during the fall of 2017 and has stayed there 
since then, indicating that there would not be further regulatory actions within the twelve 
months following the publication of the agenda.  The decision to defer adopting a final 
rule is consistent with ongoing disagreement over whether the proposed rules should 
become law.  This study informs this policy-making process by demonstrating changes in 
compensation contracting after the crisis but before the 2016 proposed rules.  Policy 
makers and interested constituents can use the current environment to assess whether the 
desired changes have already been achieved and whether stricter rules are necessary. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definition 
Total pay Total annual CEO compensation 
Lnpay The logarithm of total annual CEO compensation; when 
indicated, it is the logarithm of total CFO compensation. 
I follow Albuquerque, Franco, and Verdi (2013) in 
calculating compensation pre- and post-FAS 123R. 
Cash pay The sum of salary and cash bonus 
Lncashpay The logarithm of cash pay 
Equity pay The sum of grant date fair value of restricted stocks and 
options 
Lneqpay The logarithm of equity pay 
 
Post A dummy variable that equals 1 for fiscal years 2011-
2015, and 0 for 2003-2006. 
Treated A dummy variable that can equal 1 for one of the 
following cases (depending on the test and sample): 
 
1. Large bank Bank whose total assets at the beginning of the fiscal 
year is above the annual median in each SIC 2-digit 
industry within the final bank sample. This is the main 
method to identify treated banks.  
2. TARP participant Bank who received assistance fund from TARP around 
the crisis. 
3. Poorer performer 
during the crisis 
Bank whose buy-and-hold return from July 2007 to 
December 2008 is below the median in each SIC 2-digit 
industry, following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). 
4. Investment Bank Bank with SIC code between 6200(included) and 6299. 
Return The logarithm of 1 plus the compounded annual stock 
return using monthly returns. 
 
BSMProb The probability of bankruptcy estimated by using Black-
Scholes-Merton model, following the method introduced 
in Hillegeist et al., (2004). The volatility is calculated 
using daily stock returns of each firm-fiscal year, 
requiring at least 126 available returns. 
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Tail5 The negative of average return of a firm during the 5% 
worst return days during one fiscal year, requiring at 
least 126 available returns. 
MES The marginal expected shortfall defined as the negative 
of the average daily returns of a firm during the 5% 
lowest market return days during one fiscal year, 
requiring at least 126 daily returns available for the fiscal 
year. I use S&P 500 index returns as the market returns. 
 
Total risk The annualized standard deviation of daily returns for a 
fiscal year. 
Crash risk The negative skewness of residual firm returns during 
each fiscal year. I require at least 26 weeks of data to 
calculate residual returns. 
Upside tail – tail5 The average daily return of a firm during the 5% highest 
return days during one fiscal year, requiring at least 126 
available returns. 
Upside tail - MES The average daily returns of a firm during the 5% highest 
market return days during one fiscal year, requiring at 
least 126 daily returns available for the fiscal year. I use 
S&P 500 index returns as the market returns. 
Systemic risk I following the method introduced by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2016) to calculate systemic risk. I require 
at least 200 weeks of return data for each firm in the pre-
crisis period and post-crisis period respectively. 
Size The logarithm of total assets at the end of a fiscal year. 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of a 
fiscal year. 
Market-to-book The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of 
assets at the end of a fiscal year. The market value of 
assets equals to the book value of total assets (at) minus 
book value of common shareholders’ equity (ceq) plus 
market value of common shareholders’ 
equity(prcc_f*csho). 
Asset growth rate The percentage change of total assets from the end of last 
fiscal year. 
Lntenure The logarithm of years since the CEO took office. 
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FIGURE 1. Time Trend of Risk-Related Performance Metrics  
 
 
 
This figure displays the time trend of the percentage of firm-year observations with explicit risk-
related performance metrics in their annual grant-based compensation plans.  
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FIGURE 2. Time Trend of Compensation and Compensation Components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figures here show the time trend of average CEO total compensation as well as two 
compensation components: the cash compensation and equity compensation, for small banks and 
large banks respectively.  
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FIGURE 3. Time Trend of Stock Return 
 
 
 
This figure shows the time trend of average stock return for small banks and large banks 
respectively.  
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FIGURE 4. Time Trend of Downside Tail Risk Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These figures show the time trend of average downside tail risk measures for small banks and 
large banks respectively.  
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FIGURE 5. Size Distribution of Observations Around $50 Billion 
 
 
 
 
 
These figures display the distribution of total assets during the pre-crisis period and post-crisis 
period, for banks and insurance firms respectively.   
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TABLE 1. Sample Selection 
  Firms 
Firm-year 
observations 
Initial data from ExecuComp with Compustat) SIC code 
6000-6299 during fiscal years 2003-2007 (pre) and 2011-
2015 (post) 267  1756  
Less: missing CEO compensation and tenure  (13) (54) 
Less: missing control variables from Compustat (8) (79) 
Less: missing return and risk measures from CRSP (9) (169) 
Less: under constraints of TARP 0  (55) 
Less: firms only existing in the pre- or post-crisis period (121) (459) 
Final bank sample 116  940  
Treatment group (large bank sample) 67 463 
 
This table presents the sample selection process for the large bank sample, including banks whose 
total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year are above the median in each 2-digit SIC industry 
within the final bank sample.  
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TABLE 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Treatment Group - Large Bank Sample 
 
Pre-Crisis: N=208 Post-Crisis: N=255      
Variable  Mean   Median   Mean   Median  Mean Difference Median Difference 
Total pay 10,158 5,284 8,407 6,372 -1,751 ** 1,089        
Return 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.03  -0.01        
BSMProb 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001  0.000       *** 
Tail5 0.033 0.029 0.036 0.033 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
MES 0.021 0.017 0.027 0.023 0.006 *** 0.006       *** 
Lagged total risk 0.24 0.20 0.27 0.25 0.04 *** 0.05       *** 
Lagged total assets 89,377 40,464 94,896 42,024 5,520  1,560        
Lagged leverage 0.89 0.91 0.86 0.89 -0.03 *** -0.02       *** 
Lagged market-to-book ratio 1.18 1.10 1.06 1.02 -0.12 *** -0.09       *** 
Lagged assets growth rate 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.04 -0.05 *** -0.05       *** 
Duality 0.71 1.00 0.58 1.00 -0.12 *** 0.00        
Tenure 8.33 6.00 9.29 7.00 0.96  1.00       * 
 
 
  
5
8
 
Panel B. Control Group - Small Bank Sample 
 
 Pre-Crisis: N=217 Post-Crisis: N=260      
Variable  Mean   Median   Mean   Median  Mean Difference Median Difference 
Total pay 3,106 1,519 3,324 2,238 219  720       *** 
Return 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.02  -0.03        
BSMProb 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 ** 0.000        
Tail5 0.039 0.034 0.040 0.035 0.001  0.001  
MES 0.022 0.019 0.025 0.020 0.002 ** 0.001        
Lagged total risk 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.03 *** 0.02       * 
Lagged total assets 6,815 3,431 5,826 4,850 -989  1,419       *** 
Lagged leverage 0.78 0.90 0.76 0.88 -0.02  -0.02       *** 
Lagged market-to-book ratio 1.73 1.15 1.40 1.05 -0.33 *** -0.10       *** 
Lagged assets growth rate 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.04 -0.10 *** -0.08       *** 
Duality 0.44 0 0.49 0 0.05  0.00        
Tenure 7.93 6.67 10.77 8.379 2.84 *** 1.71       *** 
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Panel C. Large Banks vs. Small Banks 
  Pre Post Pre vs. Post 
Variable Large Small Difference Large Small Difference 
Difference-in-
Differences 
Total pay 10,158 3,106 -7,052 *** 8,407 3,324 -5,083 *** 1,969 ** 
Return 0.06 0.07 0.01 
 0.09 0.1 0.01  -0.00  
BSMProb 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 0.001 0.005 0.004 ** 0.005 * 
Tail5 0.033 0.039 0.006 *** 0.036 0.04 0.004 *** --0.002  
MES 0.021 0.022 0.001 
 0.027 0.025 -0.002 ** -0.004 ** 
Lagged total risk 0.24 0.29 0.05 *** 0.27 0.32 0.04 *** -0.006  
Lagged total assets 89,377 6,815 -82,561 *** 94,896 5,826 -89,070 *** -6,509  
Lagged leverage 0.89 0.78 -0.11 *** 0.86 0.76 -0.10 *** 0.01  
Lagged market-to-book ratio 1.18 1.73 0.55 *** 1.06 1.4 0.34 *** -0.21 * 
Lagged assets growth rate 0.13 0.18 0.04 ** 0.08 0.07 -0.01  -0.05 ** 
Duality 0.71 0.44 -0.27 *** 0.58 0.49 -0.09 ** 0.18 *** 
Tenure 8.33 7.93 -0.40 
 9.29 10.77 1.48 ** 1.89 * 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the large bank and small bank groups. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Mean differences are based on two-sided t-tests; median 
differences are based on nonparametric equality-of-medians tests. 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the large bank sample, including bank-year observations with beginning-of-year total assets 
above the annual median value of each 2-digit SIC industry within the final bank sample. 
 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the small bank sample, including bank-year observations with beginning-of-year total assets 
below the annual median value of each 2-digit SIC industry within the final bank sample. 
 
Panel C presents the differences between the small and large banks in the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period respectively, as well as the 
difference-in-differences.   
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TABLE 3. Pairwise Correlation  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Lnpay  1.00           
(2) Return 0.10* 1.00          
(3) BSMProb -0.04 -0.27* 1.00         
(4) Tail5 -0.13* -0.48* 0.48* 1.00        
(5) MES 0.09* -0.45* 0.12* 0.73* 1.00       
(6) Lagged total risk -0.09* 0.19* 0.25* 0.46* 0.18* 1.00      
(7) Lagged size 0.62* 0.02 -0.03 -0.18* 0.02 -0.17* 1.00     
(8) Lagged leverage -0.03 -0.07 0.06 -0.11* -0.07 -0.13* 0.24* 1.00    
(9) Lagged mtb ratio -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.18* -0.72* 1.00   
(10) Lagged assets 
growth rate -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.11* 1.00  
(11) Duality 0.22* 0.02 -0.05 -0.17* -0.05 -0.15* 0.21* 0.03 0.00 -0.09* 1.00 
(12) Lntenure -0.12* 0.00 -0.01 -0.10* -0.06 -0.12* -0.16* -0.10* 0.14* -0.01 0.22* 
 
This table shows the pairwise correlation of variables for the full bank sample (N=940). All the variables are defined in Appendix A. * 
corresponds to significance level at 0.05, based on two-sided tests. 
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TABLE 4. Difference-in-Differences of Pay-for-Performance and Penalty for 
Downside Tail Risk 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post 0.24*** 0.41** 0.31** 
 (3.28) (1.99) (2.12) 
Treated * Post -0.07 -0.05 0.13 
 (-0.87) (-0.22) (0.79) 
Return 0.07 0.24** 0.24** 
 (0.54) (2.10) (2.20) 
Post * Return 0.29 0.15 0.21 
 (1.59) (0.89) (1.17) 
Treated * Return 0.76*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 
 (3.75) (3.28) (2.85) 
Treated * Post * Return -1.15*** -0.90*** -1.05*** 
 (-4.83) (-3.57) (-3.88) 
Tail risk -7.23*** 3.27 4.48 
 (-5.14) (1.09) (1.32) 
Post * Tail risk 5.01*** -3.69 -2.23 
 (3.83) (-0.84) (-0.53) 
Treated * Tail risk 11.36*** 3.71 4.59 
 (7.27) (1.49) (1.44) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -21.65*** -3.84 -10.77** 
 (-4.51) (-0.76) (-2.04) 
Lagged total risk -0.47** -0.61*** -0.60*** 
 (-2.48) (-3.02) (-3.09) 
Lagged size 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 
 (3.27) (2.86) (2.88) 
Lagged leverage -0.41 -0.52 -0.48 
 (-1.03) (-1.22) (-1.18) 
Lagged market to book ratio 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (1.11) (0.94) (1.00) 
Lagged assets growth rate 0.07 0.07 0.11 
 (0.69) (0.69) (1.04) 
Duality -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (-0.74) (-0.63) (-0.65) 
Lntenure 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.65) (0.82) (0.85) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.168 0.155 0.159 
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This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty for downside tail risk, using three different downside tail risk measures respectively: 
BSMProb, Tail5, and MES. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. 
Treated banks in this table are large banks with beginning-of-year total assets above the annual 
median of each 2-digit SIC industry. Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011-
2015, and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2007. All the variables are defined in Appendix A.  t-stats are 
reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are done for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided 
tests are done for all the other terms and variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 
10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level. 
 
  
6
3
 
TABLE 5. Changes in Pay-for-Performance and Penalty for Downside Tail Risk in Subsamples 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 Large Small Large Small  Large Small 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post 0.14** 0.26*** 0.46*** 0.26 0.45*** 0.26** 
 (1.98) (3.83) (2.74) (1.60) (3.14) (2.00) 
Return 0.83*** 0.03 1.01*** 0.08 0.87*** 0.16 
 (5.46) (0.21) (5.58) (0.52) (5.25) (1.11) 
Post * Return -0.85*** 0.32 -0.88*** 0.29 -0.88*** 0.28 
 (-4.26) (1.83) (-3.96) (1.49) (-3.99) (1.50) 
Tail risk 4.13*** -6.96* 11.35*** -1.09 10.70*** 2.42 
 (3.18) (-1.67) (3.44) (-0.35) (2.99) (0.67) 
Post * Tail risk -16.48*** 5.22 -11.41*** 0.14 -14.66*** 0.12 
 (-3.26) (1.24) (-2.77) (0.04) (-3.23) (0.03) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 463 477 463 477 463 477 
Adj. R-sq 0.728 0.737 0.725 0.735 0.724 0.736 
 
This table presents the changes in pay-for-performance and penalty for downside tail risk among the subsamples, using three different 
downside tail risk measures respectively: BSMProb, Tail5, and MES. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. 
Large banks are those with beginning-of-year total assets above the annual median of each 2-digit SIC industry. Post is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011–2015, and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2007. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are 
reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are done for the interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other variables *, **, and 
*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level. 
 
  
64 
TABLE 6. Parallel Trend in the Pre-Crisis Period 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -0.14 -0.15 -0.51 
 (-0.44) (-0.40) (-1.25) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -107.79 2.64 -1.36 
 (-0.59) (0.35) (-0.15) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 425 425 425 
Adj. R-sq 0.108 0.092 0.090 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty for downside tail risk in the pre-crisis period. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of total CEO compensation. Treated banks in this table are large banks with beginning-of-year 
total assets above the annual median of each 2-digit SIC industry. Post is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 for fiscal years 2006–2007, and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2005. All the variables are 
defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. Two sided tests are done for all the 
variables *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at firm level. 
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TABLE 7. Falsification Tests: Other Possible Treatments 
Treated Group TARP Banks Poor-Performing Banks Investment Banks 
Downside Tail Risk 
Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES BSMProb Tail5 MES BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treated * Post * Return -0.18 0.04 -0.22 0.15 0.10 0.24 -0.30 -0.27 -0.22 
 (-0.70) (0.16) (-0.78) (0.56) (0.32) (0.75) (-1.00) (-0.80) (-0.65) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk 0.21 13.45 8.51 -24.62* -8.07 -6.49 -4.62 -10.98* -11.59* 
 (0.04) (2.17) (1.20) (-1.49) (-1.12) (-0.88) (-0.81) (-1.41) (-1.58) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.141 0.140 0.141 0.141 0.134 0.137 0.154 0.143 0.143 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance and penalty for downside tail risk.  
 
Column (1), (2), and (3) classify TARP participants to be treated banks; Column (4), (5), and (6) classify banks with poorer performance 
during crisis period (July 1st 2007 to Dec 31st 2008) to be treated banks; Column (7), (8),  and (9) classify investment banks (i.e., SIC 
code between 6200 and 6299) to be treated banks. 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011-2015, and 
0 for fiscal years 2003-2007. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are done for 
the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level. 
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TABLE 8. Falsification Tests: Upside Tail Potential Measures 
Panel A. Difference-in-Differences of Pay-for-Performance and Pay for Upside Tail 
Potential 
Upside Tail Potential Measure Upside Tail – Tail5 Upside Tail - MES 
 (1) (2) 
Treated * Post * Return -0.83*** -0.88*** 
 (-3.07) (-3.26) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -3.97 -7.83* 
 (-0.93) (-1.61) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 940 910 
Adj. R-sq 0.153 0.158 
 
Panel B. Changes in Pay-for-Performance and Pay for Upside Tail Potential in 
Subsamples 
Upside Tail Potential Measure Upside Tail - Tail5 Upside Tail - MES 
 Large Small  Large Small 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post 0.24 -0.06 0.22 -0.21 
 (1.42) (-0.34) (1.44) (-1.32) 
Return 0.81*** -0.08 0.84*** -0.10 
 (2.75) (-0.35) (2.94) (-0.47) 
Post * Return -0.46* 0.46 -0.48* 0.51 
 (-1.48) (1.90) (-1.56) (2.21) 
Tail risk 8.14 -2.43 10.64 -9.38 
 (1.37) (-0.54) (1.31) (-1.39) 
Post * Tail risk -5.74 2.37 -7.85 11.17 
 (-1.01) (0.54) (-0.98) (1.61) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 463 477 463 477 
Adj. R-sq 0.717 0.727 0.717 0.729 
 
This table presents the results using two upside tail potential measures, constructed similarly to 
the method used to construct the two return-based downside tail risk measures: Tail5 and MES. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. Treated banks are those with 
beginning-of-year total assets above the annual median of each 2-digit SIC industry. Post is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011–2015, and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2007. All the 
other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm 
level. 
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Panel A shows the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance and 
pay for upside tail potential. One-sided tests are done for the three-way interaction terms. Two 
sided tests are done for all the other terms and variables. 
 
Panel B shows the changes in pay-for-performance and pay for upside tail potential among the 
subsamples. One-sided tests are done for the interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all 
the other variables. 
 
  
  
68 
TABLE 9. Falsification Tests: Other Risk Measures 
Downside Tail Risk Measure Total Risk Leverage Crash Risk Systemic Risk  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treated * Post * Return -0.84*** -0.75*** -0.55** -0.89*** 
 (-3.28) (-2.73) (-2.24) (-3.16) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -0.39 0.10 -0.03 -5.08 
 (-0.54) (0.24) (-0.28) (-0.54) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 884 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.157 0.149 0.147 0.155 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty for different risk measures.  
 
Column (1) replaces downside tail with total risk; Column (2) replaces downside tail with 
leverage ratio; Column (3) replaces downside tail risk with crash risk; Column (4) replaces 
downside tail risk with systemic risk. 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. Treated banks are those with 
beginning-of-year total assets above the annual median of each 2-digit SIC industry. Post is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011-2015, and 0 for fiscal years 2003-2007. All the 
other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are 
done for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and 
variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at firm level. 
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TABLE 10. Robustness Check: Alternative Fixed Effects 
Panel A. 4-digit SIC Code Industry Fixed Effects 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES  
(1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -1.07*** -0.86*** -0.97*** 
 (-4.53) (-3.51) (-3.73) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -19.48*** -4.59 -11.10** 
 (-4.28) (-0.98) (-2.33) 
Fixed Effect SIC Industry SIC Industry SIC Industry 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.178 0.165 0.168 
 
Panel B. Institution Type Fixed Effects 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES  
(1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -1.08*** -0.86*** -0.97*** 
 (-4.52) (-3.51) (-3.70) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -19.97*** -4.93 -11.22** 
 (-4.37) (-1.05) (-2.28) 
Fixed Effect Institution Type Institution Type Institution Type 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.175 0.162 0.164 
 
Panel C. Primary Federal Regulator Fixed Effects 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES  
(1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -1.08*** -0.87*** -0.96*** 
 (-4.41) (-3.50) (-3.57) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -19.57*** -5.17 -11.38** 
 (-4.30) (-1.12) (-2.31) 
Fixed Effect Regulator  Regulator  Regulator  
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.165 0.154 0.156 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty including different fixed effects.  
 
Panel A uses 4-digit SIC industry fixed effects; Panel B uses institution type fixed effects; Penal 
C uses primary federal regulator fixed effects.  
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The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. Treated banks are those with 
beginning-of-year total assets above the annual median of each 2-digit SIC industry. Post is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011–2015, and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2007. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are done 
for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at firm level. 
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TABLE 11. Robustness Check: Alternative Control Group 
Panel A. Difference-in-differences results using insurance firms as the control 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES  
(1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -0.71*** -0.53** -0.54** 
 (-2.75) (-1.99) (-1.82) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -14.36*** -5.78 -4.30 
 (-3.09) (-1.14) (-0.76) 
Firm fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 998 998 998 
Adj. R-sq 0.127 0.123 0.128 
 
Panel B. Parallel Trend in the Pre-Crisis Period 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES  
(1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -0.38 -0.39 -0.56 
 (-0.97) (-0.78) (-1.27) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk 432.07*** -9.84 2.92 
 (2.99) (-1.19) (0.28) 
Industry fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 472 472 472 
Adj. R-sq    
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty for downside tail risk, using insurance firms as the control. Treated banks in this table 
are large banks with beginning-of-year total assets above the annual median of each 2-digit SIC 
industry. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. All the variables 
are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level. 
 
Panel A presents results using both the pre-crisis and post-crisis period; and Post is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011–2015, and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2007. One-sided tests 
are done for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and 
variables 
 
Panel B presents results using only the pre-crisis period; and Post is an indicator variable equal to 
1 for fiscal years 2006–2007, and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2005. Two-sided tests are done for all 
the variables. 
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TABLE 12. Robustness Check: Alternative Identification Methods for Large Banks 
Cutoff for Large Banks Median of Beginning Total Assets Total Assets of $50B 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treated * Post * Return -0.43* -0.46* -0.56** -0.35* -0.68** -0.65** 
 (-1.64) (-1.55) (-1.89) (-1.31) (-2.30) (-2.00) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -14.75*** -11.40** -15.55** -10.71*** -12.18** -17.20*** 
 (-3.56) (-1.75) (-2.26) (-3.24) (-2.14) (-2.80) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.143 0.139 0.143 0.162 0.175 0.173 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance and penalty for downside tail risk.  
 
Column (1), (2), and (3) use the median value of the beginning total assets for the post-crisis period as the cutoff point to classify large 
banks; Column (4), (5), and (6) use the $50 billion threshold of Dodd-Frank Act Section 956 to classify large banks.  
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011–2015, 
and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2007. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are done 
for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level.
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TABLE 13. Robustness Check: Additional Control Variables 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treated * Post * Return -1.16*** -1.15*** -0.91*** -0.95*** -1.06*** -1.04*** 
 (-4.94) (-4.70) (-3.67) (-3.62) (-3.98) (-3.90) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -21.94*** -21.52*** -3.65 -4.84 -10.58** -8.86* 
 (-4.52) (-4.16) (-0.72) (-0.99) (-2.01) (-1.63) 
Risk Executive -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 
 (-1.40) (-1.30) (-1.26) (-1.09) (-1.35) (-1.23) 
Lagged Equity Incentive   0.03   0.03   0.04 
   (0.58)   (0.74)   (0.86) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 889 940 889 940 889 
Adj. R-sq 0.170 0.171 0.157 0.158 0.161 0.163 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance and penalty for downside tail risk, adding 
additional controls. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. Treated banks are those with beginning-of-year 
total assets above the annual median of each 2-digit SIC industry.  Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011–2015, and 
0 for fiscal years 2003–2007. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are done for 
the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level. 
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TABLE 14. Robustness Check: Removing Firm-Years with Merger and Acquisition 
Activities 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -1.28*** -0.85** -0.88** 
 (-4.92) (-2.23) (-2.20) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -46.70*** -9.06* -14.14** 
 (-2.43) (-1.48) (-1.93) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 559 559 559 
Adj. R-sq 0.223 0.199 0.193 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty for downside tail risk using a sample without merger and acquisition activities. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. Treated banks are those with 
beginning-of-year total assets above the annual median of each 2-digit SIC industry.  Post is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011–2015, and 0 for fiscal years 2003–2007. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are done 
for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at firm level. 
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TABLE 15. Additional Analysis: Restricted Bank Sample 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES  
(1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return 1.32 -0.08 -0.17 
 (2.77) (-0.11) (-0.18) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -276.78 -1.12 -9.32 
 (-0.64) (-0.09) (-0.50) 
Other controls No No No 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 115 115 115 
Adj. R-sq 0.158 0.114 0.114 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty for downside tail risk, using a restricted bank sample with bank total assets between 
$30 billion and $70 billion. Treated banks are those with total assets above $50 billion at the 
beginning of each year. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. All 
the variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. One-sided tests are 
done for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and 
variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at firm level. 
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TABLE 16. Additional Analysis: Compensation Components 
Panel A. Cash compensation 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -1.29*** -1.37*** -1.43*** 
 (-2.61) (-2.56) (-2.60) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -19.98*** -14.36** -20.14** 
 (-2.66) (-1.81) (-2.19) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.141 0.149 0.148 
 
Panel B. Equity compensation 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -2.68*** -1.62* -2.54** 
 (-2.39) (-1.42) (-2.32) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -13.00 33.38 -4.53 
 (-0.73) (1.54) (-0.22) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 940 940 940 
Adj. R-sq 0.070 0.069 0.064 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty for downside tail risk within two compensation components. 
 
Panel A presents results using the logarithm of total cash compensation as the dependent variable; 
Penal B presents results using the logarithm of total equity compensation as the dependent 
variable. 
 
Treated banks are those with beginning-of-year total assets above the annual median of each 2-
digit SIC industry.  Post is an indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2011–2015, and 0 for 
fiscal years 2003–2007. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in 
parentheses. One-sided tests are done for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are 
done for all the other terms and variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level. 
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TABLE 17. Additional Analysis: CFO Compensation 
Downside Tail Risk Measure BSMProb Tail5 MES 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treated * Post * Return -0.22 -0.32 -0.36* 
 (-0.78) (-1.11) (-1.32) 
Treated * Post * Tail risk -8.47** -5.49 -7.89* 
 (-2.30) (-1.17) (-1.62) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 843 843 843 
Adj. R-sq 0.199 0.200 0.203 
 
This table presents the difference-in-differences results on the strength of pay-for-performance 
and penalty for downside tail risk. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total compensation 
of CFOs. Treated banks in this table are large banks with higher than industry median total assets. 
All the variables are defined in Appendix A. t-stats are reported in parentheses. One-sided tests 
are done for the three-way interaction terms. Two sided tests are done for all the other terms and 
variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at firm level. 
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